I realize that the following is only 2 sentences and not an entire scientific or philosophical argument, however, it was interesting to read and related to what we’ve been discussing.

World renowned Astrophysicist Neil deGrasse Tyson posted the following comment on twitter:
“Our identity is located in our brain. So the executioner’s command “Off with his head!” should really be “Off with his body!””

Mr. Tyson is a brilliant man and the director of the Hayden Planetarium here in NYC. It also seems that he agrees with some of the authors we’ve discussed so far in the belief that self is connected to the brain.

It’s not my week to post, but I feel the need to pose a question that hasn’t been addressed.  Is Damasio positing anything new?  Unfortunately, we only read the first four chapters, so I am cannot say with certainty that he doesn’t posit something later, as the book develops.  However, as I was reading this, I couldn’t help to feel that underneath the scientific language, it was a history report.  At no point did I feel that he was challenging any of the hypotheses or data available (other than his seeming disdain for his lack of credit in mirror neurons since he predicted this with as-if).  I find self to develop completely biologically, while the phenomenology and richness of individual self to be the combination of the vast differences in experience combined with genetic makeup and biological continuity.  I feel this all developed evolutionarily across time.  This evolution is incomplete (due to the lack of proof and ability to examine the historical evidence and linkage) however, hypotheses can be developed.  To me, in the 4 chapters, Damasio never really branches off from this or challenge this and I was left wanting development in the argument of consciousness or self.

During our first session, we discussed briefly the work of Antonio Damsio & Jill Bolte Taylor, and  and their dedication to the study of the brain and consciousness. It was evident that their perspectives and demonstrations on Ted Talks were uniquely different. Taylor’s discussion was a demonstrative in every way: the moment when she brought out the human brain to display the hemispheres, to her prolific performance that reflected a collaboration of knowledge and emotion both physically and emotionally. It was memorable, and then it was time to move on to Damasio’s piece. To my disappointment it was not as moving but rather, a mundane reading that was built on detailed facts and I felt as though I was sitting in a lecture room merely listening out of respect for his contributions to the study.

You can draw the conclusion that I was not really much momentum in his work for this week. But it turns out that I was a bit too judgmental. Damasio is, respectively, telling a story in both the piece Self Comes to Mind and The Feeling of What Happens.  Of course he sticks to storytelling with the ‘textbook style’ writing with sporadic diagrams and the abundance of questions as if we were taking his course. However, I thought it was so refreshing to find imagery in his work.

For one, he creatively compares the conscious mind to a grand symphonic piece which I think is a brilliant observation and an even more clever analogy:

“The grand symphonic piece that is consciousness encompasses the foundational contributions of the brain stem, forever hitched to the body, and the wider-than-the-sky imagery created in the cooperation of the cerebral cortex and the subcortial structures, all harmoniously stitched together, in ceaseless forward motion, interruptible only by sleep, anesthesia, brain dysfunction or death.”

Damasio also describes the consciousness within a ‘revelational’ perspective as well, one that follows the moment that the performer presents himself to an audience. I think the following passage really depicts the attempt to conceptualize the profound nature of consciousness:

“As I prepare to introduce this book, however, and as I reflect on what I have written, I sense that stepping into the light is also a powerful metaphor for consciousness, for birth of the knowing mind, for the simple and yet momentous coming of the sense of self into the world of the mental.”

It is interesting to compare the different ‘performances’ surrounding the conscious mind. We have one individual who blows us away with her candid display of the interference of “the universe” and the euphoric feeling that moves in and out of an almost life threatening episode. The alternative is an individual who does nothing to entertain but is found to have a way with words that keeps the reader interested in learning more about the topic.

Overall both strategies are convincing, but I am  more pleased with the fact that I was able to see further into Damasio’s  work.

Hey, sorry, not supposed to comment this week but going ahead anyway because I wonder what people think and I haven’t seen it come up yet. Yanno how Lacan’s mirror stage of infancy gets somewhat undermined by children who are born blind? I’m starting to feel that same way about Damasio and his self-related-to-making-body-maps idea. Barring extreme disease or death, Damasio claims that the constant mapping and updating of the body (homeostasis and all that) is this static, stable, grounding point around which we can say the self bases itself on (forgive the weird wording of the last section of this sentence.) What happens to a self that has undergone some kind of bodily injury? Likewise, Damasio throws the term “image” around quite a bit, but what about selves that do not see, or never have seen? Is there an accounting for this somewhere?

In “Self Comes to Mind,” Damasio employs literary techniques such as simile, metaphor, and analogy virtually on every page. While reading this text, I first was interested in defining all of Damasio’s key terms. I was hoping to be able to synthesize Damasio’s understanding of consciousness. But the repetitive appearance of these techniques turns out to be more intriguing.

The title and blurb of this book promises the reader a clarification of the relationship between the brain, mind, self, and consciousness. Cracking open the first page of the book of a chapter entitled “Awakening”, Damasio describes waking up during his flight home from Los Angeles. Damasio does not bore his reader solely with the common symptoms of airline travel but uses it as an opportunity to incite intrigue to study the phenomena of consciousness.

What’s peculiar about this opening is what arguments he makes to compel the reader to find the study of consciousness important. “Without consciousness–that is a mind endowed with subjectivity,” writes Damasio, “you would have no way of knowing that you exist let alone know who you are and what you think” (4). Damasio describes consciousness as the object that makes the “you,” being the reader, have an identity and self. In doing so, Damasio places his reader within the text. Damasio is declaring that I, his reader at this stage, have a consciousness. This seems obvious to point out. While we are all familiar with the concept of consciousness, we should still not take its existence for granted. But what Damasio is doing is endowing the reader with the possession of a consciousness, a “puzzle” that befuddles “scientists and nonscientists alike” (5).

Now I have a stake in this text. I have something that is “mysterious” (6). There are many things that I do not understand, especially when it comes to my body. But I assume that the scientific canon on the human body provides answers to any question I have on its mechanism. If I cared deeply, I could access this knowledge. But that would be impractical. Instead, I rely on expert “scientists” to possess this knowledge. Damasio creates double intrigue so as to say not only do “you,” the non-expert, lack comprehension to the thing that makes you “you” but the expert, too. In effect, Damasio is producing a journey that he invites his reader to embark. Within the first opening pages Damasio has incited intrigue, an obstacle, and, most importantly, a stake.

With an object of study, we move to Damasio qualifications. Damasio’s personal biography lists the titles of authority that enable him to discuss the topics relating to the human mind, in this case, consciousness. He is a professor of “Neuroscience, Psychology, and Neurology, and director of the Brain and Creativity Institute at the University of Southern California”. He also briefly mentions that he has been “studying the human mind and brain for more than thirty years, and [he has] previously written about consciousness in scientific articles and books” (6). Interestingly, he distinguishes studying “human mind and brain” from writing about “consciousness”. Why doesn’t he lump mind, brain consciousness together?  This distinction I do not think is unintentional. In fact, distinguishing the differences of these objects fills up much of the book’s content. In short, the brain is the physical object that can be empirically studied; the mind is thought of as the non-physical phenomena as a result of the “activity of small circuits is organized across large networks so as to compose momentary patterns”; finally, consciousness is the phenomena of “I” (19). So central to this work are these distinctions that it is easy to forget that these distinctions personally affect Damasio. Damasio articulates that he studies mind and brain but writes about consciousness, subtly demarcating consciousness outside the scope of his empirical studies suggesting that it falls outside the authority that his professional titles provide. Nevertheless,  it is from his authority as a scientist that he possesses expert knowledge on mind and brain so as to write about consciousness.

Scientifically, consciousness, in this light, might as well be a fiction. Without delving too deeply into Damasio’s exploration of consciousness (while  interesting and definitely related to this post), I think it is important to note that the concept of fiction or narrative becomes embedded within Damasio’s conception of consciousness. In fact, Damasio opens the second chapter of his book with admitting that “the narrative of mind and consciousness that I am presenting does not conform to the requirements of fiction” (33). This unabashed admission that his book functions as a “narrative” makes my argument appear redundant. Also, I would like to point out that his statement works precisely within the logic of fiction by establishing an element of suspense and expectation (‘how will this book portray consciousness as unbelievable! Must know!’). This text is more than just a narrative of consciousness: it ultimately describes the mechanisms of consciousness as operating through the logic of narrative. A term he uses, for example, to describe the process of self is “the autobiographical self” (24). Autobiographical self refers to how a “self” constructs its lived past and “anticipated future” (24). In other words, the autobiographical self constructs a story of the self. Skipping to the end of the book, Damasio finishes this narrative of consciousness and mind by discussing “storytelling” (311). “Storytelling is something brains do, naturally and implicitly” (311). He supports this claim with an evolutionary argument: “individual and groups whose brains made them capable of inventing or using such narratives to improve themselves and the societies they lived in became successful enough for the architectural traits of those brains to be selected” (311). Brains do narratives. And it is how we survive.

Consciousness exists without our understanding of what it is or how it works. This was Damasio’s first point. Damasio endeavors to unlock some of the mystery. Damasio employs narrative elements and effectively describes this work as “the narrative of mind and consciousness.” He takes his research of the human mind and brain and weaves in a character called consciousness. Damasio explicates the different parts of the brain and their functions. He provides analogies and metaphors so the science he is describing is intelligible. Our understanding of consciousness then becomes saturated with metaphors that are supposed to help us disclose the science behind consciousness but instead create a thick husk of symbols that place further obscurity between consciousness and us. But in fact, that is precisely how consciousness functions. It appears that consciousness is the process of making meaning out of the referent. In this case, using an empirical study of the brain and mind, Damasio invites us to practice consciousness in the exploration of consciousness. Thus, the book functions to articulate the unavoidable impasse of studying and understanding consciousness. If our brains do narratives, then consciousness is the signification of lived experience. It is the practice of bestowing meaning. I am not just a body responding to stimuli/phenomena but interacting with it, lifting it out of its material place and infusing a name into its being. Unfortunately, just as consciousness exists because our minds, so too, it seems, that it exists only in our minds.

Antonio Damasio seems to be on a genuine quest for balance. His stance is social, his structure academic, his style exquisitely populated by metaphor and simile. Reading him can be compared to speaking to a very elderly individual who has lived long enough to cherish every aspect of life, and with time has learned that sharing the acquired knowledge is the best way to help life in society improve. Everything in his text, from the cover and the worn-out style of the side of the pages, to the academic structure decorated with poetic images, seems to be a direct critic to the elitist and overtly intellectual rhetoric that past academic cultures have seemed to sustain and promote.

Jumps through a singular and plural narrator can go almost unnoticed, but have the effect of creating a collective absorption of knowledge, and at the same time maintain a humble distance between reader and neuroscientist. In concordance with last week’s discussion, a gender-biased style is hard to identify, with precaution of not to say absent. The constant reflecting and orienting of key terms makes the unimaginable seem extremely simple. His limited use of sources illustrates a mastery of the topic, and also a dedication to the consistent development of original ideas.

On the other hand, Susan Blackmore appears with a cut through the chase, straightforward rhetoric that has no time for doubt. She is defending a thesis that can be very much debated and problematized, and her strong attitude conveys her validity. Very active story telling and the back and forth interaction with her selves brings closer to reality the shocking assertion of an illusory self. Her discourse seems as good example to demonstrate how eloquence affects the ability to convince.

In 20 minutes Susan Blackmore runs through her theory of the self as illusion, uses some basic neuroscience to back it up and concludes that we’re not the same person from one minute to the next. I can’t be the only person to hear this and think that its absurd. While we can all admit that we all change, I am by no means the same person today that I was when I was five, but to say that today I’m not the same person I was yesterday is a bit more than can easily be swallowed.

Her analysis of the relevant neuroscience is accurate and does make her thesis a bit more plausible. As she states, there is no one place in the brain where our experience is put all together as one whole. One part of the brain translates light in our eyes into images. Another part converts sound waves into sounds we hear. There is no point in the brain that we can point to with certainty and say that is where the “self” is formed; that’s where our experiences come together, that’s where our actions are decided; that is the part of the brain responsible for self. It doesn’t exist and strongly supports Blackmore’s argument that Self is an illusion.

She takes a step too far though when she insists that self is illusion because the self changes moment to moment. While brain chemistry may change moment to moment we can not conclude that the self does as well. In fact, this assertion discredits her previous argument that the self was an illusion because it didn’t exist in the brain. If our illusion of self were changing moment to moment then it wouldn’t sound like such a strange idea to us when she first states it. In fact, she wouldn’t need to defend that stance if it were actually the human experience for the self to change so frequently.

She comes around to the idea of the ever changing self by beginning with the question, “are you conscious?” and asking people to ask themselves this question on a regular basis. She describes a sensation of becoming conscious and eventually decided that the self that became conscious today is not the one that became conscious yesterday. She states that our idea of the self as a unified, continuous experiencer is false, but I would have to disagree. One has to already, in some sense of the word, be conscious in order to ask the question, am I conscious. The sense of becoming conscious that she describes is not simply becoming conscious in general but rather becoming conscious, or you might say aware, that you are conscious. At this point in her lecture she begins to speak about mindfulness but I can’t help but think that she hasn’t read much work on the subject since I have and what I have just stated is much more along that line of thought then her theory which she claims is in line with it.

This idea of the ever changing self is not truly one of mindfulness. I have studied and practiced mindfulness and meditation for a while now and have never come across this idea in any of the works on the topic that I have reviewed. To make a conscious effort to be self-aware does not translate into being aware of a different self every time one becomes aware. In fact, the goal is to hold this sense of awareness for as long as possible which would be an impossible task if the self were not a continuous thing.

As a student of philosophy also I feel the need to point out one over-arching flaw in Blackmore’s argument. Her biggest piece of evidence for her theory is neuroscience. In her description of the science she is using as evidence she clearly states that there is no place in the brain responsible for self and given the scientific facts that is indisputable. However, she then assumes that the self cannot be a unified or continuous thing because our experiences aren’t unified in the brain. If self is not in the brain then we cannot base our ideas about self on how the brain works.

Since we all have a sense of self we can assume it is a real thing, even if we concede Blackmore’s point that it is an illusion, it is still real to each individual. If we say this thing we all have is not in the brain then it follows that it must be located somewhere else. We can guess that this “somewhere else” is also where other things we all perceive but can’t find in the brain are such as a sense of morality, sense of faith, etc. It would also be easy to argue that this “somewhere else” is where we get the things that make us human and separate us from other animals. All animals have a brain but as far as we know only humans have a sense of self, an overwhelmingly strong sense of justice, faith, and the ability to think critically and reason about abstract ideas. All these things are shared experiences of humans and not all brain possessing animals. They are also the things that remain relatively the same in us even though we change overall as we age. I would argue that this “Somewhere else” is the “Self” Blackmore has disregarded as illusion and ever changing. It’s what some might call the soul and others the mind. What is clear is that it does exist and is not part of the brain.

Perhaps Blackmore should not have been so quick to completely discard Cartesian dualism…

Whereas Siri Hustvedt surveyed multiple theories of self, Damasio’s focus seems concise and clear. “I believe conscious minds arise when a self process is added onto a basic mind process” ( 8) and later, “There is indeed a self, but it is a process, not a thing, and the process is present at all times when we are presumed to be conscious.” (8)  He is assertive, but not arrogant; he prefaces many of his ideas which expressions like, “As I see it” and “I am ready to believe.” Equally his creative phrases like “the netherlands of the nonconcious processing” – “the tragedy of plants” – the “aboutness” of neurons are humorous, clever and apt. His arguments are linear and logical.

In The Feeling of What Happens Damasio ventures that neurological observations and neuropsychological experiments have connected some aspects of consciousness to specific brain regions, a seemingly plausible premise, and further, that neurological evidence makes a duality of consciousness “transparent”. (16)  He goes on to describe the core consciousness which provides the organism with a sense of self about the here and now. The extended consciousness which provides the organism with an elaborate sense of self, and places that self at a point in individual, historical time, richly aware of the lived past and of the anticipated future….(16) These are lucid and understandable concepts make for very strong arguments, and give this reader a sense of security and conviction in the face of an elusive, abstract concept. This is Damasio’s style, smooth, assured, and articulate. This idea in particular reminded me of Sartre’s Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself from Being and Nothingness, the concept of the self that is and a self that watches, although Sartre’s argument was not based on neuroscience. (as far as I can remember)

Damasio’s work has a efficient structure, he clearly outlines his goals, with each chapter is neatly divided into topics and then each topic is broken down, thoroughly and methodically. Like Hustvedt, I get the feeling that he is using the act of writing to consolidate and clarify, to explore connections and to solidify his ideas.  Earlier this year I read ”  Metaphors we live by” by Lakeoff and Johnson, which examines the degree to which we explain many of the abstract concepts of our living experience via conceptual metaphors, which leads me to the following question:  Is self a metaphor, or metonymy for what Demasio calls the “dynamic collection of integrated neural processes, centered on the representationof the living body, that finds expression in a dynamic collection of integrated mental processes.” (10)?

Susan Blackmore’s lecture was also illuminating. I have read much Zen literature (D.T.Suzuki and Alan Watts), and can understand the concept  of the self as an illusion, albeit from a philosophical rather than neuroscientific perspective. Her ideas like “The idea that we are having a stream of experiences is so compelling that we get wrapped up in it, but it makes no sense at all to what’s happening in the brain…” and her assertion that the self only “seems to be” 1.unified 2.continuing 3.the experiencer of experience 4.the initiator of action. The implications are truly exciting in that they challenge the way we think about ourselves, and isn’t that the point….

Hi everybody. Here is some information about Struck, the theater piece we’re going to see on Friday, December 6. Tickets will be $15. Please let me know as soon as possible if you have a conflict. I’ll get you more details about logistics when I have them.

STRUCK, by NACL Theatre

HERE Arts Center, NYC

December 5-21, 2013

Created and Performed by Brett Keyser (actor), Tannis Kowalchuk (actor), Allison Waters (neuroscientist)

Created and Directed by Ker Wells

Dramaturgy and texts by Kristen Kosmas

Lighting Design by Stephen Arnold

Costumes by Karen Flood

Technical Direction by Woodstock Stage and Screen

Co-produced by Cleveland Public Theatre

STRUCK PRESS

Reviews

TIMES HERALD RECORD “A symphonic and turbulent play that weaves through moments of harrowing realism and enchanting vulnerability…” http://www.recordonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20130525/ENTERTAIN/130529773

“Your synapses are going to light up in new and different ways when experiencing this amazing event.” From Christine Howey of struck at CPT – 03.24.13  http://raveandpan.blogspot.com/2013/03/struck-cleveland-public-theatre.html

“Keyser and Kowalchuk are arresting performers who are fascinating to watch.” Andrea Simakis reviews struck for Plain Dealer(Cleveland) – 03.27.13 http://www.cleveland.com/onstage/index.ssf/2013/03/struck_at_cleveland_public_the.html

“…an exceptional piece of literature that also happens to be a show. …unlike anything I’ve ever seen before.” struck @ Cleveland Public Theatre – 03.28.13 http://new102.cbslocal.com/2013/03/28/korys-review-struck-cleveland-public-theatre/

Firstly, I am not certain which portion of my consciousness to thank, but I find myself reading Damasio’s work in a semblance of his voice, or what I may have interpreted from viewing prior class videos. His cadence, tone and soothing dialect seem to infuse conviction for an unproblematic adoption of his highly complex theories on consciousness and the body, brain, mind relationship   – as effortlessly logical and perhaps even, in the best interest of humanity. After reading these five chapters of his work, I may be persuaded to reconsider the future of humanity with perhaps more optimism given the productive possibilities for apprehending its unfolding course and yet undiscovered potential through the vehicle of studying consciousness; “Armed with reflexive deliberation and scientific tools, and understanding of the neural construction of conscious minds also adds a welcome dimension to the task of investigating the development and shaping of cultures, the ultimate product of collective conscious minds” (31).

Damasio’s composition of an engaging format for such voluminous concepts and ideas provides remarkable access for the reader. A journey through the biological evolution of neural cells, creation of the mind in the brain and eruption of self within the mind is charted with great explanatory and interpretive detail. Correlations between the internal world of individual cells and the nature and composition of the human mind and consciousness are particularly fascinating. Damasio makes several references to similarities between the processes of single and mutli cellular organisms with the universe contained in the human mind and with humanity in general; in terms of design, structure and coagulation into an enchanted landscape of synapses, communication and interdependent actions in multidimensional planes of co-existence; “The economy of a mulitcellular organism has many sectors, and the cells within those sectors cooperate. If this sounds familiar and makes you think of human societies it should. The resemblances are staggering” (37).  Damasio elucidates the evolution of neural cells’ organizational structure; from foundational cells of consciousness through “scaling up” of their intelligence to form what amounts to feelings and reflexive thought. He also validates the importance of non-conscious intelligence as the “blueprint” for the making of conscious minds and beautifully poses the question of whether human consciousness is actually a, “collective voice set free in a song of affirmation”(37), unifying the will for survival imbued in the organism’s community of cells.

Damasio  discusses life regulation or homeostasis; a term referring to an internal mechanism occurring in all living beings through which various systems undergo ongoing adjustment and malleability of function to ensure the continuation of the life-process or survival. He expands the notion of this process within humans beyond the borders of the individual organism to include the deliberate attainment of well-being in a social and cultural context, or “sociocultural homeostasis”. This aspect of human consciousness evolution is associated with the unfolding of human history in his observation of a steady decline in “violence and an increase in tolerance that has become so apparent in recent centuries would not have occurred without sociocultural homestasis” (28). Meaning, we can attribute our evolution beyond barbarism and human perpetrated destruction to the evolution of a part of our consciousness which positively relates us with our external environment- a seemingly useful attribute and one which seems counter to beliefs concerning the inherent deterioration of modern humanity at our own life- devouring hands.

Brain mapping is presented as another key principle for understanding how the self is constructed by the mind and how the brain, mind and body interrelate within the task of life-management. The brain as a “mimic of irrepressible variety” (68), lays tracks and pathways in its networks which emulate external forms and structures. The adaptability of the brain in making life management more feasible within ever changing environments is made clear in its ability to map neural patterns which account for interactions with certain objects or experiences outside the body – he sites research in monkeys and humans on observable brain patterns which occur as a result of contact with specific objects (74).  The body, Damasio states, is the critical platform for the development of the mind via the brain. It is the receptacle of the external environment, providing information and context to the brain. This seems an obvious concept but one which may be observed as out of reach to many, (non-brain injured), for whom this relationship seems to become occluded; where the link between bodily/physiological health and the mind state is forgotten or loses potency in the course of day to day existence. The crucial body to brain segue is mapped, “in an integrated manner, the brain manages to create the critical component of what will become the self” (98).  This is why Damasio’s articulation of brain mapping is central to uncovering his analysis on the formulation of consciousness and the self.  The importance of the brain’s agency over the entire being or organism is mentioned in The Feeling of What Happens as the centrally important fact in understanding the development of consciousness; where the brain’s management of life process is  directly tied to the self portion of consciousness (22).

In his discussion of the body to brain relationship the concept of the “as-if body loop” is introduced; the brain’s ability to simulate certain body states in somatosensing, or body sensing, regions as though they were actually occurring, thereby producing “as-if”, physiological responses. This extraordinary mechanism is made possible by mapping in the brain drafted through communication between brain structures which trigger specific emotions and the areas in the body to which they correspond. Damasio’s section on brain mapping ties together the examination of the development of our core consciousness as integrated biological organisms, mediating the external world though our physical embodiment and advancing into a self-producing mind; “The living body is the central locus. Life regulation is the need and the motivation. Brain mapping is the enabler, the engine that transforms plain life relegation into minded regulation and, eventually, into consciously minded regulation” (114).

This brief introduction to Damasio’s theories on consciousness certainly spurs my attention to consciously minded regulation – and sparks inquiry into how well we may be able to effectively facilitate management of our individual body, mind, brain relationship within both internal and social contexts of our day to day existence?